


# *UEFI Secure Boot*



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
# *The PC BIOS*

- ◆ Firmware embedded in non-volatile ROM
- ◆ Code that is first run when a PC starts up
- ◆ Provides very basic set of drivers for hardware
- ◆ Locates bootloader on disk (the program the starts the OS) and passes control to it after starting up.



# *UEFI As A BIOS Replacement*

- ◆ Unified Extensible Firmware Interface
- ◆ A spec for the replacement of PC BIOS's.
- ◆ Has features improving upon what BIOS provides : can read some filesystems, knows where the OS image is, provides secure boot
- ◆ Secure boot is to ensure that no untrusted software is loaded before the OS loads : e.g. boot sector viruses




# *The Security Model*


- ◆ Public key infrastructure
- ◆ GOAL : Make sure no untrusted system code is allowed to boot
- ◆ Assumptions:
  - ◆ Firmware isn't easily modifiable
  - ◆ UEFI implementation is bug-free
  - ◆ A signed OS needs to enforce the policy of not allowing ANY unsigned code to be loaded in privileged mode (kernel, drivers)
  - ◆ The signed bootloader, OS kernel and all drivers are bug-free

# How Does Secure Boot Work?

- ◆ Consists of a Platform Key (Pkp<sub>pub</sub>) and 2 databases of Key Exchange Keys (KEK<sub>pub</sub>): a blacklist and a whitelist
- ◆ The Pkp<sub>pub</sub> is used to add or remove keys from the KEK<sub>pub</sub> database.
- ◆ The KEK<sub>pub</sub> whitelist are signatures for trusted bootloaders and operating systems; the blacklist consist of revoked keys and hashes of known malware
- ◆ The databases are updated during firmware updates.



# Securing The Boot Process



# *Root Of Trust*

- ◆ How do I get signed?
- ◆ Who owns the signing key?
- ◆ Who decides who gets on the whitelist/blacklist
- ◆ Will hardware ownership shift from consumer to a small cabal of key owners?
- ◆ Who inspects the bootloader/OS/device driver to ensure it enforces the policy

# *How Can I Modify An OS Now?*

- ◆ Who does that anyway?
  - ◆ Hobbyists
  - ◆ Researchers
  - ◆ Device driver writers – device manufacturers – loadable kernel modules must now be signed
  - ◆ Linux companies



# *General Purpose Computing Being Increasingly Locked Down?*

- ◆ Don't panic! We can still disable secure boot or have customisable platform keys.
- ◆ For now.
- ◆ ARM devices that want to be “Windows certified” cannot disable secure boot.
- ◆ OEMs don't have to provide the disable secure boot functionality
- ◆ Likewise for custom mode
- ◆ GPL3 violation

# References

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