sidrops@IETF'98 Chicago, March 2017


draft-yossigi-rpkimaxlen-00

The use of maxLength in the RPKI




Yossi Gilad (Boston University)
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
When used properly, the RPKI defeats subprefix hijacks





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


When used properly, the RPKI defeats subprefix hijacks










attack is highly effective because 168.122.0.0/24 is unannounced



maxLength misconfigurations are common!

- > forged-origin subprefix hijack affects any prefix in ROA where
 - maxlength m > prefixlen p, unless
 - every subprefix of length m is announced in BGP

maxLength misconfigurations are common!

- > forged-origin subprefix hijack affects any prefix in ROA where
 - maxlength m > prefixlen p, unless
 - every subprefix of length m is announced in BGP

- 16% of the IP prefixes in ROAs have maxlength > prefixlen
- 89% of these are vulnerable to forged-origin subprefix hijacks
 - Even large providers are vulnerable

Recommendations

- > As a best common practice:
 - > Operators should refrain from using maxlength in ROAs. Uls should convey that.
 - ROAs should instead have explicit lists of prefixes authorized to be originated by a single AS
 - ➤ Whenever possible, use **minimal** ROAs where each listed prefix is originated in BGP.
- > The RPKI already supports this. No extra ROAs needed.

Recommendations

> To reduce the number of RPKI filtering rules, we developed software that RPKI local caches can use to compress lists of prefixes from ROAs back to (AS, prefix, maxlength) tuples

https://github.com/yossigi/compress_roas

> See our technical report: http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1015.pdf